Reflections on the Limits of the Current International System

 Greenwell Matchaya LLB PhD

Recent events in global affairs have once again brought to the surface a longstanding tension at the heart of the international system: the gap between the principles that govern relations among states and the realities of power that shape how those principles are applied. Sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-intervention remain foundational norms of international law, reaffirmed in treaties, charters, and diplomatic practice. Yet their practical enforcement appears uneven, contingent, and increasingly dependent on material capability rather than universal restraint.

This tension is not new. What is striking is its persistence, despite decades of institutional development, legal refinement, and multilateral coordination. The international system has invested heavily in building rules, norms, and forums for cooperation, yet the recurrence of cross-border interventions, indirect conflicts, and selective accountability suggests that the challenge may not lie primarily in the absence of rules. Rather, it may lie in the structure within which those rules operate, and the incentives that structure creates for different actors.

International law is often presented as a neutral framework governing the conduct of formally equal states. In principle, all states enjoy the same legal status and are subject to the same obligations. In practice, however, the effectiveness of international law depends heavily on voluntary compliance and collective restraint. Where power is distributed unevenly, enforcement becomes selective. Institutions may articulate norms, issue statements, or authorise measures, but their capacity to respond decisively is constrained by political realities. As a result, accountability appears inconsistent, and confidence in shared rules can erode.

This does not imply that international law is irrelevant or insincere. Rather, it highlights a structural limitation. Law functions most effectively when incentives align with compliance. Where the perceived costs of deviation are low for some actors and high for others, rules become aspirational rather than operative. In such contexts, restraint is shaped less by legality than by calculation.

A brief historical perspective reinforces this point. Political boundaries and state systems have never been static or inevitable. In Europe, modern state boundaries emerged gradually through centuries of war, dynastic consolidation, treaties, and shifting balances of power. Major settlements repeatedly redrew the map in response to changing political and economic realities. Even within relatively stable regions, unification, fragmentation, and reconfiguration have been recurring features of political life.

In Africa, the demarcation of states followed a markedly different trajectory. Borders were largely drawn during the colonial period, often with limited regard for pre-existing political entities, social structures, or economic systems. These boundaries were later inherited wholesale at independence, not because they were optimal, but because altering them was judged more destabilising than preserving them. As a result, African states emerged as formally sovereign but structurally constrained, with internal diversity and external vulnerability embedded from inception.

In Asia, boundary formation reflects a mixture of imperial legacies, decolonisation, civil conflict, and ideological partition. Some states consolidated around long-standing civilisational cores, while others were shaped by abrupt divisions or externally mediated settlements. The Americas offer yet another pattern. North America, in particular, saw the emergence of large federated entities that internalised diversity and scale within single sovereign systems. In Latin America, colonial administrative units evolved into independent states, often retaining boundaries that reflected imperial convenience rather than economic or institutional coherence.

The common thread is clear. Political boundaries have always been constructed, contested, and revised under particular historical conditions. What distinguishes the present moment is not that boundaries exist, but that the global system treats the current configuration as effectively final, despite profound changes in technology, population, economic integration, and the distribution of power.

Seen in this light, it is not unreasonable to ask whether the architecture of the international system itself might warrant reconsideration. This is not an argument for immediate reform, nor a claim that alternative configurations would necessarily be superior. It is simply an acknowledgment that institutional structures are historically contingent rather than immutable.

It is within this context that the thought experiment explored here should be understood. Rather than focusing on the conduct of individual states or the merits of particular actions, it asks a different question: whether alternative structural arrangements could reduce the frequency with which power is exercised destructively by embedding restraint more deeply into the system itself.

The thought experiment imagines a world organised around a small number of large, fully sovereign political collectives rather than a large number of independent states. These collectives would not be alliances or voluntary clubs, but consolidated sovereign entities, comparable in internal logic to existing large polities. Each would be internally diverse and heterogeneous, encompassing different regions, populations, and historical experiences.

Crucially, deterrence would be embedded structurally. Each collective would possess broadly comparable levels of advanced defensive capability from the outset. Under such conditions, restraint would arise not from goodwill alone but from reciprocal capability and mutual vulnerability. No collective could reasonably expect to impose decisive harm on another without incurring severe costs itself. The incentive to destabilise or coerce another would diminish because the consequences would be predictable and broadly shared.

This structural balance would also reduce the strategic value of proxy conflicts. Under the current system, indirect conflict thrives where power is fragmented and asymmetrical. Direct confrontation is avoided, and competition is displaced into weaker or contested spaces. In a system composed of large, consolidated sovereign collectives, fewer such spaces would exist. Attempts to weaken another collective indirectly would invite reciprocal responses elsewhere, yielding limited net advantage.

Indirect competition would not disappear. Intelligence gathering, political influence, and attempts to shape internal dynamics are deeply embedded in statecraft and would likely persist. However, where capabilities are broadly symmetrical, their effects would tend to neutralise one another. Over time, competition would shift away from prolonged destabilisation toward internal performance, innovation, institutional quality, and social cohesion.

Military deterrence alone, however, is insufficient for sustainable influence or development. The survival of certain highly sanctioned states demonstrates that deterrence can secure sovereignty, but it does not generate prosperity, institutional reach, or broad developmental progress. The most resilient actors combine security with economic production, internal markets, and institutional capacity. Fragmented deterrence pursued independently by many states would increase instability rather than reduce it, raising the risks of proliferation, miscalculation, and escalation.

For regions such as Africa, this structural lens is particularly relevant. Resource abundance without internal demand, industrial capacity, or security leverage does not translate into bargaining power. Value is often captured elsewhere, and vulnerability persists despite abundance. Embedding such regions within larger sovereign collectives would fundamentally alter incentives, anchoring growth in scale, integration, and internal markets rather than exposure.

This reflection does not reject international law or multilateralism. Nor does it claim to offer a blueprint for reform. Instead, it suggests that enduring stability may depend less on refining norms and more on rethinking the structures within which those norms are expected to operate. The aim is not to eliminate rivalry, but to channel it in ways that reduce large-scale harm.

Thought experiments of this nature are not predictions or prescriptions. Their value lies in illuminating assumptions, exposing constraints, and widening the space for serious intellectual debate about the future of global order. Such debate requires engagement by those willing to grapple with complexity rather than settle for easy conclusions. If nothing else, it invites reflection on whether the world we inhabit is the only one that could reasonably exist, or simply the one history has delivered thus far.

Channel any feedback here to greenwellmatchaya@yahoo.com

 

Author Bio

Greenwell Matchaya, LLB, PhD is an economist and legal scholar with extensive experience in international development, political economy, and public policy. He brings an interdisciplinary perspective that integrates economic analysis with legal reasoning, particularly in relation to international law, sovereignty, and global governance. His work spans policy advisory, strategic leadership, and multi-country initiatives, with a focus on institutional design, resource governance, and long-term development challenges. Trained in both law and economics, he writes to examine structural questions at the intersection of power, legality, and development, and to stimulate thoughtful intellectual debate on the future of global order.

 

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not represent the positions, policies, or perspectives of any institution, organisation, or entity with which the author is affiliated or works. This piece is intended as a conceptual reflection and thought experiment designed to stimulate serious intellectual discourse. It does not advocate specific political positions, policy actions, or institutional reforms, nor should it be interpreted as such.